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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA:
AN APPRAISAL

In recent years there have been notable cases in which
United States involvement in African affairs has had a serious
bearing on the United States' general international position,
affecting its relations with the United Nations and other
states, both African and non-African. The foremost of these
cases is South Africa. In the view of many observers of the
situation, the actions of the South African government cause
reactions that jeopardize United States interests throughout
the remainder of independent black Africa, undermine United
States influence in the United Nations, and stimulate the
nationalist movements within and outside South Africa to seek
support from various communist sources. In sum, the apartheid
policies of South Africa present a direct irritant to peaceful conditions in the area and a barrier to satisfactory
1
coexistence between the great powers.
I.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

To analyze the bases of United States policy toward South
Africa and the possible directions of that policy, it is
essential to understand precisely what stakes the United States
has in that country. This is especially important since critics
of United States policy in the Republic often contend that various
interests prevent politically vulnerable United States policymakers from undertaking a thorough re-evaluation of our commitment. Basically, the extent of United States involvement in
South Africa, and hence the stakes underlying a discussion of
United States alternatives, can be divided into two broad areas:
strategic-military and economic.

iSee, e..

HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT OF
SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-610,
91st. Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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A.

Strateqic Interests

For fairly obvious geographic reasons, the continent of
Africa is of less importance to the United States than are
Europe, Asia or Latin America, and the area of southern
Africa is of relatively minor importance to United States
security interests. 2 South Africa's position on the Cape sea
routes between Europe and the Far East does give it some
strategic significance. This position is considered to be
of potential importance to the United States and Great Britain
during any crisis in which the use of the Suez Canal might be
denied. Should widespread military operations develop in the
Indian Ocean area, South Africa on the west and Australia on
the east remain the only available alternate advance bases.
This is a factor more likely to affect the United Kingdom than
the United States because of greater United States capability
3
in long-range air transport.
In addition, both the United States and the United Kingdom
have an interest in the availability of the Simonstown Naval Base
in South Africa in time of hostilities. Simonstown's naval
repair operations are presently the only such facilities within
more than 5,000 miles. Yet the United States has long sought
an alternative to the relatively remote and vulnerable base.
Also of some importance are the NASA missile-tracking and deep
space probe stations which the United States maintains in South
Africa. As indicated, these facilities have some strategic
utility to the United States and its allies, but certainly not.
so great that were it deemed politically wise to abandon them,
there could be no replacement. If such abandonment were part of
a program of actions taken against South Africa, then undoubtedly
black African governments north of the Zambezi River could be
called upon to make alternative sites available. Many of the
communications and trading facilities could be located at sea.

2 McKay,

Southern Africa and Its Implications for American
Polic, in SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES 25 (W. Hance ed.
1968).
3 Leiss, Efforts to Alter the Future: Military Measures
0
in APARTHEID AND UNITED NATIONS COLLECTIVE MEASURES 133 (A. Leiss
ed. 1965).
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Aside from these factors, perhaps the single greatest
military consideration for the United States is that pointed
out by Rupert Emerson:
It may well be that the greatest potential military
significance of Africa for the United States is neither
the strength of its armed forces nor its utility as
a base of operations and source of supply but the
danger that racial or Cold War complications might
cause the involvement of American forces on the
continent as they have already become involved in
Korea or Vietnam.4
Indeed, the prospect of a racial confrontation between antiCommunist whites (for whom there would exist considerable
sympathy in the United States) on the one hand and African
nationalists accepting Communist assistance on the other is
one in which it is very difficult to see how the United States
--not to mention Africans--could do anything but lose.
B.

Economic Interests

If the present military-strategic concerns of the United
States in South Africa are minimal and largely negative in
character, the United States' economic stake in that country
is larger and more positive, though it represents only a very
small proportion of the total United States foreign economic
interests.
More than 260 American firms, through affiliates or branch
offices, are doing business in South Africa. The total private
direct investment is 601 million dollars, according to a 1968
State Department estimate. With indirect investment added,
the total is somewhat over 800 million dollars. This represents
1.1 per cent of total United States foreign investments, though
the 19.5 per cent rate of return has been consistently higher
than the world-wide average. It is estimated that the 260
American firms earn more than 100 million dollars yearly from
5
these investments.
While the importance of United States investments in and
financial transactions with South Africa is quite minor in

4 R.

EMERSON, AFRICA AND UNITED STATES POLICY 31 (1967).
based on Department of State estimates, in HOUSE
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 98-99, 123-25.
5 Figures
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relation to total United States foreign investments, they play
a more significantrole for South Africa. At the end of 1967
the United States ranked second among holders of South Africa's
foreign liabilities with 13.8 per cent of the total, behind
the United Kingdom with 61.8 per cent.
So far as trade is concerned, in 1966 the Republic took
1.3 per cent of the total United States exports, or approximately
30 per cent of United States exports to Africa as a whole.
United States imports from South Africa are only about 1 per
cent of total imports by value, with some decline having occurred
in their relative significance since 1962. On the other hand,
trade with the United States is considerably more important to
South Africa, accounting for 17.7 per cent of total South
African imports. (For instance, American companies produce
approximately 60 per cent of South Africa's cars and trucks.)
Finally, the United States received about 11.6 per cent of the
Republic's exports in 1967, excluding gold sales.
Experts on United States-South African economic relations
predict that if trade between the two countries were interrupted, the impact on the United States economic system would
"not be particularly important."6 Alternative markets could be
found without great difficulty for many United States products.
The loss of imports from South Africa would be most important
for certain grades of asbestos, platinum, industrial diamonds
and uranium oxide, but in no case would it result in serious
difficulties for the United States. It is predicted that even
if a unilateral cessation of trade occurred, many minerals and
metals from South Africa would find their way to the United
States via third-party countries.
The unilateral cessation of economic relations between
South Africa and the United States, including all trade and
direct investment, would undoubtedly have a greater impact
on South Africa than the United States, since American economic
investment to some extent aids South Africa in its drive toward
self-sufficiency. American oil companies have been particularly
active in aiding South Africa in prospecting for oil. Eight
American oil companies, one French, and a South African company
have been granted concessions to prospect for oil and gas on
South Africa's continental shelf. The'New York Times has
reported that these concessions are a part of the South African
government's intensified search for oil to strengthen its hand
6 Hance,

The Case For and Against United States Disengagement
from South Africa, in W. Hance ed., supra note 2, at 124.
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in the event that international sanctions are applied because
of the government's apartheid policies. 7 Standard Oil and Mobil
Oil, through subsidiaries, handle 48 per cent of South Africa's
oil refining capacity. 8 In addition, Gulf Oil is presently
engaged in exploration in Zululand. Certainly these efforts
contribute to what has become a top priority in South Africa's
security interests: viz., diminished vulnerability to international oil sanctions and the related political pressures.
Yet few observers conclude that a cessation of this United
States economic involvement would be sufficient to undermine
the South African economy or to bring serious pressure to
bear on the domestic political structure.
Potentially much more serious than any direct impact of
economic disengagement on the United States (or even upon South
Africa) would be the indirect effects if the United Kingdom
were to be drawn into similar economic disengagement following
any United States actions. The dependence of Britain on its
economic relations with South Africa is much greater than that
of the United States, accounting for about 5 per cent of United
Kingdom exports and 3 per cent of imports. For instance, it is
estimated that an economic break between these two countries
would result in worsening the United Kingdom's balance of payments
by 840 million dollars in the first year.9 A survey of British
interests in South Africa undertaken under the auspices of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs concluded that a total
disruption of commerce would cause the immediate loss of a
twentieth of Britain's export trade, the disappearance of a
traditional source of supply for a number of items, and the
sudden drying up of 144 million dollars annually in foreign
exchange. 1 0 The loss of from 150,000 to 225,000 jobs in Britain
would result. Furthermore, the earnings derived from trade
in gold would cease and British shipping, banking and insurance
operations would be heavily affected.
Since the present priorities of British policy are
centered around (1) economic stability, (2) a reasonably balanced
foreign exchange, and (3) institutional entry into the European
7 N.Y. Times,
8 HOUSE COMM.

Oct. 22, 1966, at 17, col. 1.
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 99.
9 Hance,
supra note 6, at 123.
1 0 D. AUSTIN, BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA 160 (1966).
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Common Market, any measures which jeopardize British-South
African economic ties may be considered basically counterproductive to British objectives, at least in the short run.
These facts are not significantly altered by the general
British outlook and traditions which impel a sense of responsibility for regrettable conditions in southern Africa. Since
one of the unwavering tenets of contemporary United States
foreign policy is the need for close alliance with a strong
and secure Great Britain, it is highly unlikely that any
United States government would undertake a policy that would
force Britain into such a compromised situation. There is
a sense, then, in which United States policy toward South
Africa can be seen as an attempt to balance the uncertain
liabilities of its South African policy against the long-term,
clearly-defined interest of Britain's role in the European
security system.
II.

FORCE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

In any effort to arrive at a comprehensive and realistic
United States policy toward South Africa, serious consideration
must be given to the likelihood of generalized internal violence
in South Africa. The feasibility of unilateral or collective
efforts to alter the status quo in South Africa depends largely
on-the state of internal security in the Republic and the
degree of unrest among the Bantu population. On the one hand
it is frequently argued that unless the United Nations (or
the United States and the United Kingidom, acting unilaterally)
moves quickly to bring about a change in South African racial
relations, violence within the country will soon become so
widespread that it will lead from a general political and social
breakdown to a bloody racial war that could not be confined
within the borders of South Africa 1 1 Others suggest that while
there is clearly widespread resentment of the apartheid policies
of the South African government, and while violence and terrorism
appear to be increasing, the opposition is too disorganized,
dispersed, and effectively repressed to make large-scale
hostilities possible. Therefore, in examining whether the
government of South Africa can be forced to grant political,
social, and economic equality to its black African population,
three separate factors become relevant: (1) the extent of South
African repressive force, both political and military; (2) the
nature and extent of African opposition to the government of the
Republic, the degree of its organization, and the resources at

llsee, e.g., Gross, The Coalescing Problem of Southern Africa,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 1968) .
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its disposal; (3)the likelihood that outside assistance to
black nationalist groups within South Africa, either from the
United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Liberation
Committee, or any nation acting unilaterally, would be sufficient
to overthrow the government of the Republic or force it to change
its domestic racial policies.
A.

Repressive Force

Since the wave of sabotage and African nationalist guerrilla
actions in 1960-61, the South African government has engaged
in a massive build-up of counter-insurgency and political
repression forces. Especially significant has been the unprecedented application of arbitrary police power to large numbers of
the population, African and white. Its actions include mass
arrests, the "sabotage acts," the "90-day" and "180-day"
laws, and other rigorous legislation. In addition, there has
been a large expansion of various police and defense forces,
the importation of arms and the building of munitions factories,
the establishment of police reserves and home guards, and the
development of a radio network to link the country's nearly
1,200 police stations. It is presently possible for the
police to detain a state witness for up to 6 months. Between
1960 and 1966 nearly 10,000 persons were detained or arrested
for offenses or charges of a political character. The size
of the daily prison population, which is generally felt to be an
effective indicator of the level of coercion of a government,
nearly doubled from 39,920 to 76,227 in 1965 though the total
population of the country increased by less than one quarter
during this same period.
In addition to the police units, there are the permanent
forces of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Citizen's
Force, all of which have been not only greatly expanded in
numbers in recent years, but also reorganized to work more
efficiently with each other. At the present time, the government
contends that it can instantly mobilize a more or less trained
army of 250,000 whites to defend their terrain. The defense
budget has increased drastically, reaching approximately 460
million dollars in l968. 1 2 Experiments continue with a domestic.ally-produced SAM. There is also some research on nuclear
weaponry, although this would be virtually useless in a situation
12THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 1969, at 32.
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of internal belligerency. South African government officials
have frequently said that this defense build-up is designed to
protect the country from possible foreign invaders, but it is
clear, according to most observers of the situation, that the
government intends to use these defense forces against any
domestic insurgent actions.
The extraordinary powers granted to the police by recent
legislation have greatly strengthened its ability to prevent
mass political organization. The Minister of Justice can ban
meetings, and the presence of police and informers at those which
are held discourages attendance. The confiscation of the files
of protest groups has multiplied their planning problems. The
latest legislation controlling the movement of Africans in
urban areas further increases the ability of the police to
curtail political Organizing and agitation. The urban townships in which black Africans live must be separated from
white areas by an unoccupied buffer strip at least 500 yards
wide (the huge black African area of Soweto is located a full
15 miles from Johannesburg).
Electricity and water in the black
African townships are controlled from the white areas. Furthermore, unlike most other areas of the world in which major
insurgencies have developed, the South African landscape is open
and not heavily wooded, making the terrain largely unsuitable
to the tactics of modern guerrilla warfare and particularly to
the development of any significant supply lines from outside
the country. Finally, it should be noted that the administrative
features of apartheid have been designed in a manner that
greatly facilitates surveillance and control of the non-white
population. The entire system of identification passes and its
rigid enforcement, the separation of Bantus into small, isolated
groups, the educational system that stresses vernacular languages
which make communication among native groups increasingly difficult--all these inhibit the development of an effective mass
movement among the Bantu population.
B.

Opposition to Apartheid

The net effect of these factors and the mobilization of the
South African military and police forces has been a virtual
paralysis of overt opposition to the regime within the Republic.
Contrary to the predictions of those who have left the country,
it seems that South Africa is not on the verge of violent
revolution. Among the third of the black South Africans who
live on the Bantustans, only a few have gained a degree of
political consciousness. That which is being felt is being dealt
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with to some extent by the forms of local political autonomy
granted to the Bantustan populations. 1 3 Furthermore, the
political elites which are developing within the Bantustans
have an emotional as well as political interest in the survival
of the present system, and are not likely to sympathize with
any attempt at revolutionary organization. The third of the
Bantus who live in the white agricultural districts are too
widely scattered and geographically isolated to be able to
resort to effective joint action. The remaining third of the
black Africans who live in the urban areas can be restrained
fairly easily as a result of the new townships' being fully
equipped for the suppression of insurrections. and street
fighting. Nor do the South African authorities have much to
fear from the foreign laborers who are employed largely in
the mining operations in the North. Not only are they
readily subject to deportation for any political activity, but
also their earnings are quite high in relation to earnings in
other African countries. In short, the white South African
elite is dedicated to the proposition that revolution is never
inevitable. Given a ruthless and efficient repression (something that the Portuguese attitude has never fully permitted
in their African territories), involving the physical
destruction of leading revolutionaries and their lines of
communication, it is not unthinkable that South Africa could
control any incipient revolutionary movement indefinitely.
Few governments in history have been willing to pay the price
for absolute repression. It remains to be seen if the economic
and political climate in South Africa will permit that country's
white population to persist in such morally repugnant policies.
C.

Prospects for Intervention

In contrast to the build-up of South Africa's police and
military power, the independent states to the north not only
lack the military ability to cope with South Africa but do not
have the facilities to transport their forces to the southern
end of the continent. Next to South Africa itself, the United
Arab Republic has the largest ground force on the continent-approximately 130,000; Algeria, with 70,000 troops, and Morocco,
with 36,000 are next in rank. Only two other African states,
Ethiopia and Tunisia, have ground forces over 10,000 and many
sub-Saharan African states have 5,000 or fewer. 1 4 The disparity
1 3 Munger,

South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 379 (Jan. 1969).
1 4 Leiss,
supra note 3, at 142.
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between the strength of South Africa and the other African states
is even more marked when the equipment and training of forces
is compared. The problem is further complicated by the fact
that many of the black African states have need of their forces
at home to deal with internal situations such as the recently
thwarted Biafran secession in Nigeria. Finally, factionalism
within the OAU had become so intense by 1966 that several
countries had completely cut off their financial contributions
to the OAU committee for the liberation of southern Africa,
and the activities of the committee had virtually ceased. These
difficulties, together with the lack of training and the enormous
logistical problems that be involved in any combined operations
against South Africa make it very doubtful that the African
states alone could bring their forces to bear against South
Africa.
Nor is it likely that any Communist country will soon
become involved in the liberation movements in southern Africa
in sufficient strength to alter the military balance. In spite
of the fact that insurgent groups in Angola, Mozambique and, to
a lesser extent, South Africa receive arms and technical training
from Communist China, the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the Eastern
European bloc, the Communist countries are restrained from
deeper involvement by the same organizational and logistical
problems that plague the Western powers.
There is considerable discussion from time to time about
the feasibility of United Nations collective military actions
against South Africa. Such collective military measures, considered from a purely military point of view, are practical in
spite of the fact that they would probably entail a sizable
and of both the white and
loss of life of United Nations troops
15
black populations of South Africa.
According to an extensive study of the types and costs of
United Nations military intervention under Chapter VII of the
Charter, there is "no doubt" that, although the South African
forces are large, well equipped and highly trained, "the resources
of the major members of the United Nations are16 more than adequate
to overcome any resistance they might offer."
1 5 It

is estimated that the cost of operations each month would
be about 95 million, and casualties on the attacking side would
run from 19,000 to 38,000 killed and wounded. Id. at 150, 165-70.
1 6 1d. at 153.
See also INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCES
(L.

Bloomfield ed. 1964).
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The difficulties underlying such measures, however, are
not primarily military, but political. The use of military
force by the United Nations, like its use by an individual
nation, is essentially a political decision. For the major
powers, who would be required to provide the largest proportion
of the manpower and financing of these operations and who would
most likely have to take the initiative in proposing and planning
them, such a decision to proceed against South Africa would rest
on an exhaustive assessment of the range 6f political costs and
gains. On this basis, the likelihood of United Nations collective
military intervention is slight. For instance, the Soviet Union
refused to support the position of the African states regarding
South West Africa in 1967 at least in part because it does not
wish the United Nations to establish the precedent of usage of
an effective peace-keeping body. At the present time the
United Kingdom is far too vulnerable to risk a direct conflict
with South Africa. The United States is reluctant to limit
its ability to pursue unilateral action by becoming irrevocably
involved in an area where its security interests are marginal.
French policy toward the area is by no means consistent with
support for United Nations collective military actions against
South Africa. 1 7 In the face of such political obstacles, the
United Nations is likely to remain a useful device for "peacekeeping" operations in certain limited situations, but an
unrealistic basis for major military operations seeking a
profound alteration in the political structure of southern
Africa.
In response to these conditions, United States policy in
the United Nations regarding South Africa has continued since
1963 to be one of cautious gradualism. When the United States
voted for the December 16, 1966, Security Council resolution
imposing selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, its
action was probably prompted more by the desire to assist Great
Britain in her Commonwealth relations and to retain a degree of
support from the other independent nations of Africa than it was
by any genuine indignation at Rhodesia's domestic politics or
an assessment of a "threat to the peace" within the meaning of
1 7 The

French contribution to South African arms supplies
now includes over 100 Panhard armoured cars and over 400 steelplated French riot trucks. The main air force equipment comes
from France, including a French-trained squadron of Mirage 111-E
fighter bombers with air-to-ground missiles. THE ECONOMIST,
May 10, 1969, at 32.
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Article 41 of the Charter. The fact that the United States
refuses to endorse such action against South Africa can,
of course, either be praised as sensible and realistic or
condemned as a cowardly refusal to face up to the consequences
of a difficult situation. The readiness of the United States
to take drastic action against Cuba, China, and other Communist
regimes is inevitably contrasted with its scruples and
hesitations regarding South Africa. For instance, one critic
notes that "the United States presently boycotts and embargoes
countries in which over a third of the world's population lives.
Yet it has been unwilling to go beyond a ban of arms and
ammunition to implement United Nations resolutions against
18
apartheid. "
It is unclear, however, what conclusions one is to draw
from such analyses. They can be understood as advocating
either complete cessation of United States intervention abroad;
or intervention in undesirable non-Communist, as well as
Communist, situations; or, finally, merely substitution of
such reactionary targets as, South Africa for the Communistoriented targets of intervention which have characterized
post-World War II United States foreign policy. If either of
the latter two alternatives are called for--if the United
States is expected to bring its economic and military resources
to bear upon South Africa through unilateral or United Nations
initiatives--then those actions are likely to prove as counterproductive as have many of its recent anti-Communist ventures.
Any government which urges mandatory economic sanctions against
South Africa must be willing to acknowledge the possibility of
its actions provoking a direct and bloody confrontation. The
prevention of such open conflict in southern Africa, polarized
along racial lines, must be the foremost end of United States
foreign policy in that area. Critics have argued that the
present South African policy of the United States is simply a
postponement of the conflict that is destined to develop when the
level of internal disruption from guerrilla activity reaches a
critical level. Yet all indicators point to the conclusion that
such a nationalist uprising is not, in fact, inevitable. The
South African government's rigid hold on the domestic situation
is being increasingly supplemented by flexibility in dealing
with its black neighbors to the north. Many South African whites
18Partners in Apartheid: United States Policy on South
Africa, AFRICA TODAY, March 1964, at 11.
PAX AMERICANA 318 (1967).
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See also R. STEEL,

believe a modus vivendi could be reach with a black-ruled
Rhodesia, just as it has been achieved with Malawi, Lesotho,
Botswana, and Swaziland. Nor is it inconceivable that some
working arrangement could be reached in the future if moderate
nationalist forces should succeed in driving the Portuguese
from Mozambique. Faced with this situation, and with
the fact that the United States lacks any legal or moral basis
upon which to justify an aggressive intervention in South
African affairs, United States policy-makers are left with the
sole alternative--however unpleasant--of using the means presently
at their disposal to alleviate the condition of non-whites in
the Republic.
III.

DISENGAGEMENT AND THE IMPACT OF AN EXPANDING ECONOMY

Disengagement is often presented as being an intermediate
policy alternative between sanctions and military intervention
on the one hand, and a passive, detached policy on the other.
Proponents of disengagement argue that United States policy
must be made credible in its opposition to racial discrimination
and specifically to the apartheid policies of South Africa.
If the United States cannot support sanctions against South
Africa for strategic or other reasons, then at least it can
withdraw its positive support and end the accompanying responsibility. There is a feeling that the United States policy of
"consultation and persuasion" has failed to produce the desired
results, leading advocates of disengagement to insist that
something concrete must be done to impress upon the South African
government our abhorrence of apartheid. Such action, it is
contended, would improve United States credibility with the
Africans who are dismayed by what they regard as a hypocritical
policy, and would give encouragement to the small but determined
group of liberal whites within South Africa. All of these
arguments contain considerable merit. But in the final analysis,
a weighing of the pros and cons of disengagement must be based
upon conclusions concerning the impact of South Africa's
improving economy. The central issue is whether the non-white
South African population is being aided by the country's
economic growth (for which United States involvement is at least
partially responsible), with the policies of apartheid being
adversely affected at the same time.
Depending on the specific measures adopted, the various
forms of disengagement could reflect a government policy of
neutrality, noncooperation, or dissociation. According to
William Hance's extensive survey, there are at least four basic
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forms that United States disengagement from South Africa might
take. They may be summarized as follows:
(1) reduction of
United States government involvement in South Africa, including
removal of the NASA tracking station and severing diplomatic
relations with South Africa; (2) reduction of United States
economic involvement, including measures to dissuade or
prohibit new investments or other capital movements; (3) regulations restricting or prohibiting personnel movement, tourist
travel, cultural exchanges, and permanent emigration to South
Africa;
(4)
restrictions on transportation and communications
through the denial of ports and airfields to South African
ships and planes or to ships and planes of all nationalities
destined for or coming from South Africa; and the discontinuation
of postal telephone, and telegraph communications with the
Republic.
As suggested earlier, it is unlikely that any of these
various proposals for disengagement would pose serious problems
for the United States. Government and military facilities
could be located elsewhere. The damage suffered by American
business interests, while of course distasteful to certain firms
and investors directly involved, would hardly impose an unmanageable burden upon the United States economy. Yet a number of
doubts persist about the long-range utility of disengagement.
If one of the principle ends of United States foreign policy
vis-a-vis South Africa is to stimulate change in the structure
of that country's internal politics, and not simply to inflict
deprivation on South African whites for the injustices they
have perpetuated against the non-white population, then
disengagement as a means toward that end is of limited value.
It does not provide satisfactory answers to the questions which
a policy of disengagement raises.
First, in spite of the involvement in certain important
sectors, United States economic relations are not sufficiently
important to South Africa for unilateral economic disengagement
to have a severe impact on its economy. There has been a trend
since 1962-63 toward a rapid growth of domestic savings and a
relative decline in the role of foreign capital in South Africa.
It is estimated that the Republic could provide 80 to 90 per cent
of present capital needs from domestic-resources and that it
could meet all essential requirements for several years in the
event of a cessation of all--not just United States--foreign
funds. 2 0 South Africa is well prepared to offset any effects
19Hance, supra note 6, at 119-30.
20Leiss, supra note 3, at 121.
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of economic sanctions by stockpiling, rationing, preemptive
purchasing, the extension of labor controls, and repatriation
of foreign labor.
Second, South African dependence upon the United States
is most significant in the quantitative and qualitative
contribution of American firms to the manufacturing sector. In
view of the relatively favorable record of manufacturing
industries in South Africa with respect to wages and new
job opportunities for non-white South Africans, the effects
of the present and growing emphasis of United States investment
in manufacturing should not be negated by an arbitrary United
States disengagement.
Third, to the extent that United States disengagement
would impose a burden on the economy of South Africa, that
burden would surely be first and most deeply felt by the
non-whites of South Africa and the dependent African states
surrounding the Republic. Frequently other Africans or
refugees from the Republic proclaim that the Bantu population
is eager to sustain what is expected to be a temporary
hardship in order eventually to attain a measure of political
freedom, but in view of the enormous sacrifices inevitably
involved, these assurances are not always convincing.
In considering the impact of economic disengagement,
there is also the complicating factor of the economic dependence
on South Africa of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and, to a
lesser extent, Malawi and Zambia. The first three would
undoubtedly be caught in any crossfire between United States
efforts at economic pressure and the government of South
Africa. Lesotho lies entirely within the Republic. Swaziland
is enclosed on three sides by South Africa and its only
alternative outlet to the sea is through potentially hostile
Mozambique. Botswana is also bordered on three sides by
South and South West Africa, but does have outlets via Rhodesia
and Zambia. Lesotho suffers the most vulnerable dependence,
with 45 per cent of its adult male population absent at any
one time in South Africa for work and other purposes. Botswana
normally has about 23,000 of its estimated 600,000 people
residing and working in South Africa. In Lesotho, receipts
from voluntary deferred pay disbursements and remittances
received from workers outside the territory were estimated
to be 2.6 million dollars by 1965. Workers also bring
back additional sums of money and goods purchased in the
Republic. Total annual benefits were estimated at 2.8 million
dollars to Botswana in 1965 and at 750,000 dollars to
Swaziland.
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The geographic and economic dependence, as well as the fragile
nature of the three economies, gives South Africa a considerable
leverage over the activities within these countries. There is
no reason to suspect that this leverage would not be used
with considerable ruthlessness in the event of economic pressure
on the Republic resulting from United States disengagement.
Because of this fact, the leaders of Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and Malawi have all stated that they could not support
economic measures against South Africa in view of their
dependence on trade and earnings from migrant labor employed
in South Africa.
Fourth, there is little historical or psychological
evidence for the conviction that sufficient external pressure
on South Africa will necessarily lead to flexibility and
change in the direction of a more open society. On the other
hand, there is every reason to believe that such a transition
will most certainly not result from permitting South Africa
to proceed in the diplomatic and political void which would
result from a policy of disengagement. Just as it was a
mistake to suspend South Africa's voting privilege in WHO,
and to give it cause to withdraw from UNESCO and the ILO,
it would be a further mistake to cut off the remaining contact
through diplomatic and commercial channels, thereby leading
to the illusion that the United States has successfully
washed its hands of responsibility. Such abdication has
proven notably unsuccessful in the case of Rhodesia. As the
United States delegation has stated in debate before the
Security Council, "As for suggestions of diplomatic isolation,
persuasion cannot be exercised in a vacuum. Conflicting views
cannot be reconciled in absentia." 2 1 The fact that only
minimal positive achievements have thus far resulted from the
United States policy of "consultation and persuasion" is not
sufficient reason either to abandon the effort altogether by
disengagement or to adopt mandatory economic or military
sanctions that could clearly prove counterproductive.
Fifth, those who conduct business in South Africa assert
the continuing validity of the maxim that for major trading
nations, "except in times of war, markets and goods are
neutral, and one trades neither with friends nor enemies
but with customers," In addition, investors argue that it is
the duty of the United States State Department to determine
foreign policy and that private enterprise should not be
21
Quoted in Hance, supr note 6, at 117.
22Hance, supra note 6, at 124.
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called upon to formulate such policy as a substitute for
governmental inaction, or to impose private economic sanctions
when official sanctions have not been legislated.2 2 To call
for economic disengagement of private trade and investment
in this manner is thus to apply a double standard by
advocating a business interposition in foreign domestic
politics that would surely be criticized in any other
country than South Africa.
Finally, there is the important and widely-discussed
issue of the impact--economic and political--that the
expanding South African economy is having on all segments
of South African society, and the ways in which a United
States disengagement would potentially alter that situation.
The broad claims for an improving South African economy,
and for continuation of United States business participation
in it, are that it provides a strong base for the future
of all the inhabitants of South Africa by broadening and
diversifying the economy. The underlying assumption is
that prosperity encourages wants and forces a sharing of
power among the rising social and racial groups. It is
further noted that the objective of securing the economic
and social development of all races can best be achieved
if the standards already attained by the whites are being
improved, an objective which can be reached only by
cooperation between the races in all spheres of a strengthening economy.
In the long run, an improving economy increases the
likelihood of change in existing political and racial policies.
Newell M. Stultz, for instance, notes that "where in the past
ideology and economics have pulled in opposite directions,
as in the case of 'job reservation' [exclusively for white
employees], economics has usually prevailed." 2 3 Similarly,
Leo Kuper has predicted that the major source of change within
South Africa is likely to be in the tension between the
economic and political systems. Presumably, there must be
some point at which an equilibrium can no longer be maintained
between continued economic growth and increasing political
4
rigidity.2
If economic forces are actually having a favorable impact
in South Africa despite policies designed to restrict the role
23 Stultz,

The Politics of Security: South Africa Under
Verwoerd, 1961-66, JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 19
(Apr.241969).
Kuper, The Political Situation of Non-Whites in South
Africa, in W. Hance ed., supra note 2, at 103.
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of non-whites in the economy, one would expect to find,
for instance, increasing percentages of non-whites employed
in certain sectors of the economy and wages improving more
rapidly than the average. These are, in fact, the currently
prevailing trends in South Africa. Hance's analysis of
demographic, employment, and wage relations in the Republic
suggests that all of these forces are "working more or less
25
powerfully against the stated goals of apartheid."
Due to the rapid economic growth, non-whites in South
Africa are being increasingly integrated into positions
originally reserved for whites. As a result of the tightness
in the South African labor market, the legislation governing
"job reservation" and "influx control" into the urban areas
is gradually coming to be marked more by its exceptions than
by the formally enforced rules. Consequently, at least in
the economic sphere, apartheid is becoming an illusion. The
non-whites are not being crowded out of the economy but
rather are being increasingly absorbed, albeit in lower
positions and at lower wages, except in the manufacturing
and construction sectors. In the latter two areas, wages
have shown a significant relative improvement in recent
years. South African government protests notwithstanding,
it does not appear that there will be further restriction
of this integrative process. The recently completed South
African five-year development plan for 1963-1969 was based
on a substantial increase in the number of non-white workers
in industry. It was estimated for the purposes of this plan
that while the white working population would grow from
1,210,000 (1963) to 1,360,000 (1969), the non-white employed
population would increase from 4,870,000 (1963) to 5,490,000
(1969)--or a 12.5 per cent increase in the white employed
26
population and a 12.7 per cent increase for non-whites.
In order to reduce the increasing pressure from the
employment-seeking non-whites on the South African labor
market, the national government is attempting to develop the
Bantustans economically by means of the Bantu Development
Corporation, an industrial finance company with a working
capital of 500,000 .pounds. At first no "white" capital was
admitted to the Bantustans, on the ground that it would lead
to "undesirable colonialistic relations."
In 1965 this ban
was removed and white entrepreneurs permitted to establish
2 5 Hance,

supra note 6, at 157.
Apartheid: Checks and Balances, INT'L AFF.
Q. REv. 299 (Apr. 1967).
26 Snellen,
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enterprises in the Reserves through the Bantu Investment
Corporation. The Corporation regulates the investments, pays
part of the profit to the investors and reinvests the remainder in the Bantustans. In addition, the government is attempting to establish labor possibilities for the Bantus within
daily reach of the Bantustans, thus limiting the inflow of
non-whites into the theoretically all-white urban areas.
To this end, the government has demarcated strips bordering
on the Reserves where special facilities are granted to
white "border industries" which do not necessitate job
reservation provisions. It is highly likely that the absence
of such restrictions in the border industry areas will tend
to erode the prejudice that non-whites are incapable of holding
jobs requiring advanced technical skills and further point
to the underlying absurdity of "job reservation" laws in
bther areas.
The crucial question is whether or not the tentative
economic advances made by non-whites as a result of increasing
racial integration in manufacturing and industry will inevitably result in the erosion of apartheid policies in the
political arena. The most oppressive aspects of the nonwhite's existence in South Africa are not economic deprivations,
but are rather the lack of voting rights, representation in
the National Assembly, and the complex of repressive laws
that restrict virtually every aspect of the African's civil
and personal life. After examining recent developments in
the Republic, Edwin Munger points to signs of limited hope:
voting privileges and rapid Africanization within the Bantustans, tempering of original African opposition to the Bantustan concept, and a new South African civility and diplomatic
flexibility toward the independent African states to the
north.27 Yet the continuing difficulty is that South African
policy-makers have done little to show that they are convinced
that measures others deem repressive--such as pass laws,
prohibitions against interracial marriage, and the absolute
suppression of political dissent--are incompatible with
economic growth and prosperity.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The dilemma that conditions in South Africa pose for
United States foreign policy is obvious. If the present
situation in that country is not exactly stable, it is at
2 7 Munger,

supra note 13, at 385-86.
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least rigid. The government of South Africa has successfully
established a legal and military structure that can prevent
the radical transformation of its political and social
system, at least in the foreseeable future. Only massive
collective military action could alter the present balance of
power. In the event that sufficient economic or military
sanctions were taken to implement standing United Nations
resolutions, there is absolutely no assurance that even the
fragile modicum of stability that presently exists in the
area would survive. Indeed, there is every reason to
suspect that if open conflict were precipitated and the
present government of South Africa overthrown, the result
would be a long and bitter period of racial and Cold War
ideological confrontation throughout the entire southern
half of Africa. The impact that such developments would
have on United States interests in South Africa is impossible
to predict with any degree of certainty, but it is probable
in view of many years of United States equivocation that any
government representing the sentiments of the 82 per cent
of the South African population that is non-white would be
at least to some extent hostile to the United States. This
situation has dictated that the United States accept the
short-term and vulnerable stability in tacit cooperation with
the white minority government as preferable to a longer-range
policy of almost certain conflict, followed by a stage of
South African political development during which the maintenance of United States interests would be highly unpredictable.
The basic rationale underlying this distasteful choice has
not changed significantly from 1966, when Assistant Secretary
of State Williams informed the House Subcommittee on African
Affairs that "we must frankly admit that the problems that we
and other like-minded nations face regarding South Africa
28
remain virtually intractable.'
The difficulty of the situation does not mean, however,
that there are no modifications of present policy that might
be undertaken to promote long-term conditions of internal
stability and racial cooperation in South Africa. On the
contrary, the ends of United States policy will best be
achieved by maximizing all constructive means to eliminate
racial antagonism short of direct intervention in South African
affairs. As indicated previously, however, military and
economic sanctions, as well as economic disengagement, represent, at best, negative and potentially counterproductive
2 8 Quoted

in R. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 107.
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forms of pressure.
On the other hand, the weight of evidence points to the
fact that continued economic expansion in South Africa will
begin to break down the artificial barriers between the
races and reduce the probability of widespread armed conflict
in the area. To insure such integrative effects of economic
development insofar as it involves American businesses,
Congress should enact legislation providing that every United
States business firm operating within South Africa be
required to observe strictly the fundamental laws applicable
in the United States prohibiting racial discrimination in
employment procedures, wage determination, job promotions,
and housing. If objections are raised by the South African
authorities, then at least the burden would be shifted to
them to elect between giving up the gains from American
industry or permitting that industry to operate free from
the restrictions of apartheid.
There are a number of other measures that might be
adopted which do not jeopardize either the present stability
in the area or the potential for future gains for the nonwhite population through economic growth. Of foremost
priority would be a comprehensive economic aid program to
Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, eventually extended to
include Zambia and Malawi. Such an aid program, designed
to strengthen the economic interdependence between those
countries' economies and decrease the dependence upon South
Africa, would permit them to exercise a genuine choice
between cooperation or non-cooperation with South Africa.
Second, all political refugees from South Africa and South
West Africa should be accepted in the United States and afforded
the same assistance as refugees from various Communist countries.
Third, the United States government should seek stricter
enforcement of the arms embargo to South Africa, including a
ban on sales of American-made items such as heavy trucks and
planes that could be converted to military use. The United
9tates should also use its influence to halt such sales by
Japan, France, and other countries. Fourth, the United States
government should closely examine the over-all utility of the
present nuclear cooperation agreement with South Africa.
Finally, the United States should restrict the granting of
visas to certain South African government officials and
athletes with a view toward excluding them when black Americans
of similar status are excluded from South Africa.
With the adoption of these and other positive measures,
the United States need not be resigned to a passive policy
which places total reliance upon a repressive stability.
Rather, United States foreign policy could provide the lead
in establishing an acceptable and beneficial framework
for political change in southern Africa.
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